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Abstract 
This paper analyses information from survey data collected in the framework of the 
Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) on patterns of firm-level adjustment to 
shocks. We document that the relative intensity and the character of price vs. cost and wage 
vs. employment adjustments in response to cost-push shocks depend — in theoretically 
sensible ways — on the intensity of competition in firms’ product markets, on the importance 
of collective wage bargaining and on other structural and institutional features of firms 
and of their environment. Focusing on the pass-through of cost shocks to prices, our results 
suggest that the pass-through is lower in highly competitive firms. Furthermore, a high 
degree of employment protection and collective wage agreements tend to make this 
pass-through stronger. 
Keywords: Wage bargaining, Labour-market institutions, Survey data, European Union. 
JEL code: J31, J38, P50. 
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Non technical summary 
In this paper, we analyse how the extensive firm-level information collected in the framework 
of the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey can yield novel insights 
regarding the way in which firm decisions distribute market shocks across prices, wages, and 
employment. Firm-level reactions to shocks, shaped by structural and institutional features 
that differ importantly across countries, influence the dynamics of prices and quantities 
along microeconomic and macroeconomic adjustment processes, with important and 
controversial welfare and policy implications. While stable wages and stable employment 
are beneficial for uninsured workers, labour market rigidity constrains labour (re)allocation, 
reducing productivity and profits, and may increase the extent to which cost-push shocks 
are passed on to prices. This in turn makes it more difficult for monetary policy to achieve 
price stability. 
We focus on the relationship between structural and institutional features of the 
firms’ environment, and the relevance of price, employment, and wage adjustment in firms’ 
reactions to shocks. The very rich structure of the WDN data makes it possible not only to 
identify the persistence and commonality of (hypothetical) shocks, but also to relate the stated 
reaction strategies to self-reported and country-level features of the firm’s environment. 
We analyse specifically the role of the intensity and international character of output market 
competition, and of the incidence of collective-bargaining constraints on firm-level wages. 
Our results indicate that these factors are highly heterogeneous across countries and firms, 
and that they do shape the relevance of price, wage, and employment adjustment: Product 
market competition reduces the relevance of price reactions to cost shocks. Moreover, these 
shocks tend to be distributed across wage and employment reactions in ways that depend 
on the extent of firm-level wage flexibility and on the presence of temporary workers. 
Our analysis shows that firms react to shocks in wages and others costs in 
theoretically sensible and empirically informative ways. A firm in a competitive environment 
has less control over the price it charges. When prices are sticky, however, a high elasticity 
of product demand and small margins make it easier for wage and cost shocks to overcome 
the cost of price changes. In the survey data, firms that report facing strong competition 
in the product market are less likely to increase prices and more likely to reduce costs after a 
wage shock (stated in the survey question to be common to all firms in the industry). A higher 
export share in total sales has a qualitatively similar role, whereas the presence of collective 
wage agreements at industry or national level makes a price increase more likely. The data 
also seem to suggest that price increases are more likely in countries with more stringent 
employment protection legislation. 
The second part of the study focuses on cost-cutting strategies and the factors that 
explain the choice of the strategy. The data indicate that competition and other indications 
of a high labour-demand elasticity increase the likelihood of cost-cutting strategies via labour 
costs, either through wage adjustment or employment reduction. We also find that firms 
covered by collective wage agreements are more likely to look for cost reductions by reducing 
the number of temporary employees and less likely to reduce wages. Overall, it appears that 
temporary employment acts as a buffer against fluctuations in permanent employment and 
against wage fluctuations. EPL insulates permanent employment from cost-push shocks 
but makes adjustment in temporary employment more likely. 
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Assessing the extent to which such features imply differences in the behaviour 
across countries and firms in our sample can help determining the extent to which the wage 
moderation apparent in recent European experiences is due to stronger product market 
competition, within and across countries’ borders, and how much reflects weaker union 
power in wage setting, with important implications for inflation transmission mechanisms. 
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1 Introduction 
The way in which firm decisions distribute market shocks across prices, wages, and 
employment is an essential element of microeconomic and macroeconomic adjustment. 
Shaped by structural and institutional features that differ importantly across countries, 
firm-level reactions to shocks shape the allocation and dynamics of wages and employment, 
with important and controversial welfare and policy implications. While stable wages and 
stable employment are beneficial for uninsured workers, labour market rigidity constrains 
labour (re)allocation, reducing productivity and profits, and may increase the extent to which 
cost-push shocks are passed on to prices. This in turn makes it more difficult for monetary 
policy to achieve price stability. 
At the economy-wide level, the relative importance of various adjustment channels 
generally depends on institutional and structural features [see e.g. Bertola (1999)]. Collective 
bargaining privileges wage stability. Employment protection legislation aims at stabilising 
employment. Moreover, more intense product market competition, as implied by international 
economic integration, makes it more difficult for firms to absorb the resulting loss of 
production efficiency. At the microeconomic level, administrative and survey data have been 
analysed from relevant perspectives, e.g. by Guiso et al. (2005), Leonardi and Pica (2007), 
as well as Cardoso and Portela (2009). 
In this paper, we analyse how the extensive firm-level information collected in 
the framework of the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN)1 survey can yield 
novel insights on these important issues. We focus on the relationship between structural and 
institutional features of the firms’ environment, and the relevance of price, employment, 
and wage adjustment in firms’ reactions to shocks. 
The very rich structure of the WDN data makes it possible not only to identify the 
persistence and commonality of (hypothetical) shocks, but also to relate the stated reaction 
strategies to self-reported and country-level features of the firm’s environment. We focus 
specifically on the intensity and international character of output market competition, and 
on the incidence of collective-bargaining constraints on firm-level wages. Our results indicate 
that these factors are highly heterogeneous across countries and firms, and that they do 
shape the relevance of price, wage, and employment adjustment in theoretically sensible 
ways: Product market competition reduces the relevance of price reactions to cost shocks. 
Moreover, these shocks tend to be distributed across wage and employment reactions 
in ways that depend on the extent of firm-level wage flexibility and on the presence of 
temporary workers. 
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we document the data set 
and outline how theoretical considerations motivate the empirical specifications. Section 3 
investigates the influence of firms’ characteristics on price and cost adjustments, and 
Section 4 turns to consider different cost-adjustment strategies applied by firms. In each case 
we report descriptive statistics as well as controlled regressions that provide evidence of a 
statistically significant role for product market competition and wage bargaining frameworks 
in shaping firms’ responses to shocks. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                                          
1. The WDN connects researchers from 24 European central banks and is coordinated by the European Central 
Bank (ECB). 
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2 Data and theory 
2.1 Available data 
Within the WDN a harmonised questionnaire was set up and each participating National 
Central Bank was responsible for its translation and the conduct of the survey in its own 
country. Some central banks conducted the survey themselves (often through their branches), 
others outsourced it to opinion research centres. This approach resulted in a variety of data 
collection methods ranging from fill-in questionnaires sent by traditional mail and 
electronically, to interviews by phone and face-to-face interviews. 16 euro area and non-euro 
area countries2 participated in the survey. However, our analysis only draws on the 
information from 14 countries (nine countries from the euro area and five non-euro area 
countries), as the phrasing of the relevant questions in the German and the Greek 
questionnaires deviates slightly and thus, results in non-comparable data. 
 
Table 1. Composition of the sample 
 
Country Number of firms in % 
AT 557 3.7 
BE 1,431 9.4 
CZ 399 2.6 
EE 366 2.4 
ES 1,835 12.0 
FR 2,029 13.3 
HU 2,006 13.2 
IE 985 6.5 
IT 953 6.3 
LT 343 2.3 
NL 1,068 7.0 
PL 1,161 7.6 
PT 1,436 9.4 
SI 666 4.4 
Total 15,235 100 
 
As shown in Table 1, the total number of observations is 15,235 from seven different 
sectors (manufacturing, energy, construction, trade, market services, financial intermediation 
and non-market services).3 Across countries, the sample size ranges from 343 in Lithuania 
to 2,029 in France. All firms have more than five employees. As the sampling probabilities 
and the non-response rates vary across firms, we use ex-post sampling weights that correct 
for these imperfections. Furthermore, in order to make our results representative for the 
                                                                          
2. The 16 countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. Luxemburg also participated 
in the survey. However, the data from Luxemburg are not yet available. 
3. See Table C1 in Appendix C for details. For more details on the survey data in general see Druant et al. (2009), 
Babecký et al. (2009a), and Galuscak et al. (2010). 
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whole workforce in the sectors covered, we use employment adjusted sampling weights. 
Put differently, our data-set represents around 50 million employees. 
The survey was conducted between autumn 2007 and spring 2008. At that time the 
economic conditions were perceived as being quite favourable. In 2007 real GDP grew 
by 2.7% in the euro area and the ECB (2007) forecasted it to grow between 1.5 and 2.5% 
in 2008. Moreover, the inflation rate was 2.1% in 2007 and was forecasted to increase to 
levels between 2.0 and 3.0% in 2008. Although in retrospect we know that the financial crises 
already started to spread out, at the time the survey was conducted the consequences of 
the financial turbulences in the U.S. were underestimated by far. Economic conditions that 
prevail when a survey is conducted are likely to influence the answers given by firms. 
Thus, we summarise that the economic conditions at the time the WDN survey was 
conducted were close to equilibrium conditions. However, firms expected consumer price 
inflation to increase slightly in the year ahead because of external price pressures stemming 
from food and energy goods. 
This paper focuses its attention on firm-level adjustment strategies in reaction to 
hypothetical cost shocks. One shock is an unanticipated increase in the cost of an 
intermediate input, and the other shock represents an unanticipated increase in wages 
(for example due to contracts bargained at higher levels). Both shocks were supposed 
common to all firms in the market, and the wage shock was explicitly considered permanent.4 
The respondents were asked to assess the relevance of four different adjustment strategies 
in response to these shocks: (1) an increase in prices, (2) a reduction in profit margins, 
(3) a reduction in output and (4) a reduction in costs. Unless they rated ‘cost reduction’ as 
completely irrelevant, respondents were in each case additionally asked to indicate how 
they reduce costs, choosing between reduction of base wages, of flexible wage components, 
of permanent or temporary employment, of hours worked per employee and of non-labour 
costs. See Appendix A for the exact wording of the questionnaire. 
2.2 Relevant theory 
We bring to bear on these data a partial equilibrium perspective on firms’ optimal employment 
strategies, focusing on the interaction between shocks and price, employment, and wage 
adjustment. We assume a “right to manage” situation, where employment and hours are 
chosen by firms (possibly subject to hiring and firing costs), while wages may be bargained 
collectively. In that setting, the relevance of price and cost reactions depends on the shape of 
the firm’s marginal revenues and marginal productivity (hence marginal costs). In turn, these 
depend on the firm’s market power, and on institutional constraints on wage and employment 
adjustment. Similar insights would also be relevant if employment were an element of 
collective bargains, or in competitive frameworks where shocks (especially when they are 
common to the industry) are associated with wage changes along local labour supply curves. 
As wages and other costs vary, firms’ choices are limited by demand conditions, and 
possible price adjustment constraints. When prices are flexible, firms move along the product 
demand curve, and employers should choose employment so as to equate the wage to 
labour’s marginal impact on firm’s revenues. For a perfectly competitive firm with flexible 
prices, this is labour’s marginal productivity, multiplied by the product’s price. For a firm with 
market power, it is the marginal revenue product. Under flexible prices, margins may be 
                                                                          
4. While firms were also asked to consider reactions to a demand shocks, it is conceptually easier to study whether and 
how labour-cost adjustment is shaped by the firm’s environment in response to the two hypothetical cost-push shocks. 
Thus, this paper concentrates on the two cost shocks. 
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adjusted if the elasticity of demand varies [as in e.g. Gali (1994)]. If prices are sticky, however, 
margins need to be adjusted when costs change. Thus, the relative relevance of the ‘increase 
prices’ and ‘reduce output’ should depend on the extent of price stickiness. 
In response to supply shocks that (like those mentioned in the survey questions) are 
common to all firms, it is more likely that prices rather than costs are the preferred adjustment 
strategy, when the output market is more competitive and firms have less control over the 
prices they charge. Under perfect competition, in fact, prices would be equal to marginal 
costs, and would necessarily change when wages or other input costs are shocked. When 
prices are sticky, however, a high elasticity of product demand and small margins make it 
easier for wage and cost shocks to overcome the cost of price changes. Firms that face 
costs of changing prices (as in menu-cost models) can keep prices fixed in response to cost 
shocks because their pre-set prices are higher than marginal costs, and the margin can 
absorb the shock. A lower elasticity of product demand implies larger margins and, for a 
given cost of changing prices, makes price rigidity a more likely outcome. The survey does 
not offer quantitative information on the size of desired or actual price changes, which in 
Calvo models depend on expectations as well as on current marginal cost changes. 
The survey does, however, offer qualitative information as to the relevance, and perhaps the 
likelihood, of price adjustment as a response to shocks for each firm. 
We find it particularly interesting and insightful to focus on how reaction strategies 
covary with structural and institutional features of the firms’ business environment in 
which choices are made. As outlined formally in Appendix B, the relevance of employment 
and wage reactions in a firm’s cost-minimisation strategy in response to shocks depends 
essentially on the elasticity of its demand function, and on institutional constraints. Along 
its demand curve, wage and employment responses are expected to be larger when labour 
demand is more elastic. International economic integration is generally expected to increase 
the elasticity of labour demand as well as labour productivity [see Andersen et al. (2000) and 
Andersen and Skaksen (2007)]. Such firms should also feel intense pressure to reduce 
costs, and whether they want to and can do so through wage and/or employment 
adjustment (rather than through a catch-all ‘other cost reduction’ strategy) should depend 
on the relevance of labour in their production function. As discussed in e.g. Scheve 
and Slaughter (2004), when a firm’s production and investment choice spans international 
borders, the elasticity of labour demand is expected to be larger. Substitutability of labour 
with other factors of production is also obviously relevant, hence accounting for technological 
features (e.g. by controlling for sectors) is important in our empirical analysis. 
Turnover costs may imply that wages and employment are not along the (static) 
labour demand curve [see e.g. Bertola (1999)]. Hence, not only technological conditions, but 
also institutional features like employment protection legislation, are important determinants 
of the extent to which that standard first-order condition may be slack in the aftermath of 
shocks. The ability of wages to respond to firm-level and common shocks depends 
on institutional features as well as — and in European countries arguably more strongly — on 
local labour market conditions along the lines of e.g. Topel (1986). Employment adjustment 
should be larger when wages are rigid, and smaller when turnover is more costly [Bertola and 
Rogerson (1997)]. Thus, the wage and employment components of cost-reduction responses 
should be allowed by our empirical specification to depend on firms’ institutional environment 
in terms of both wage-bargaining institutions and employment flexibility. Moreover, it should 
depend on other relevant structural and institutional features of their environment. In this 
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respect, the survey provides useful information as to the prevalence of temporary work and 
the level of wage bargaining. 
The relevance of each reaction channel is obviously related to that of other possible 
reactions for each firm. Obviously, a firm’s propensity to adjust costs rather than prices 
depends on how easy it is in practice to do so. This explains why cost-related characteristics 
are relevant for the choices analysed in Section 3 (between prices and costs). In principle, 
the character of a firm’s product market should determine whether costs rather than prices 
are adjusted. However, it should not be directly relevant for cost-adjustment strategies. 
This justifies an explicit two-stage estimation procedure, whereby the predicted probability 
of cost-adjustment relevance is included in the cost-adjustment specifications to control 
for sample selection. In practice, however, selection of firms into the sample analysed 
in Section 4 appears to be driven by the survey’s structure rather than by product-market 
competition indicators. Accordingly, we provide an assessment of the extent to which price, 
margin, cost, and other strategies covary. However, we do not formally model statistical 
relationships across the two stages of the firms’ survey replies. 
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3 Adjustment to cost and wage shocks 
3.1 Descriptive evidence 
To understand what the survey evidence can contribute to our understanding of the issues of 
interest, we consider the information available on firm reactions to input-cost shocks in 
general, and wage shocks in particular. First, respondents were asked to imagine that these 
kinds of shocks hit their firms. Second, they had to assess how relevant the different 
adjustment strategies in response to the shocks would be. They could choose among the 
options “very relevant” (4), “relevant” (3), “of little relevance” (2) and “not relevant” (1). 
The numbers in brackets give the scores attached to the degree of relevance. 
There is clearly a lot of heterogeneity across countries as regards not only the 
character, but also the overall intensity of adjustment. Figure 1 shows for each country 
the percentage of firms that assign “very relevant” or “relevant” to the possible adjustment 
strategies. In the Figure, countries are sorted according to the means of the four percentages 
which, shown by black lines, range from more than 75 percent in EE to less than 30 percent 
in HU. 
Table 2 lists the four different adjustment strategies in question (reduce costs, 
increase prices, reduce profit margins and reduce output) and the relevance that they have for 
the respondents. Columns 1 and 3 give the average score across all respondents, whereas 
columns 2 and 4 give the proportion of respondents indicating that a particular adjustment 
strategy is “very relevant” or “relevant” for them. Approximately 70 percent of the respondents 
indicate that the reduction of other costs and the increase in prices are “very relevant” and 
“relevant” options in response to a cost shock. Around 57 percent of the firms indicate that a 
reduction in profit margins is a relevant answer, whereas only approximately 23 percent say 
that they reduce output after a cost shock. 
Figure 1. The percentage of firms assigning “very relevant” or “relevant” to an 
adjustment strategy after a cost shock, per country 
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Thus, about two thirds of all firms increase prices in response to an input-cost 
shock, while one third will keep them constant. Furthermore, our results suggest that 
the fraction of firms increasing prices after a wage shock is slightly lower. Moreover, 
after wage shocks reducing costs, increasing prices and reducing profit margins seem on 
average slightly less important than after other input-cost shocks, probably suggesting 
that firms experienced on average smaller wage shocks than cost-push shocks in general. 
 
Table 2. Reaction after cost shocks and wage shocks 
 
Adjustment strategy after a cost shock after a wage shock 
 Av. Score Proportion Av. Score Proportion 
Reduce costs 2.88 70.95% 2.69 62.14% 
Increase prices 2.80 68.07% 2.68 61.84% 
Reduce margins 2.56 57.14% 2.49 53.26% 
Reduce output 1.86 23.41% 1.88 24.25% 
 
 
To assess the pattern of covariation or substitutability across different survey 
answers, Table 3 reports the empirical correlations between the various adjustment 
channels, i.e. answers to the question on cost shocks and the one on wage shocks. 
All the cross-correlations presented in the table are positive and highly statistically 
significant. The diagonal elements of the sub-matrix reporting between-shocks correlations 
(the bottom-left quarter of Table 3) are all above 50 percent and exceed the corresponding 
off-diagonal elements significantly. This indicates that there is a tendency for firms to use the 
same adjustment strategies in response to both cost and wage shocks. The highest 
correlations in the “within-shock” sections of the table correspond to the margin-output pair 
(approximately 32 and 34 percent in the case of wage shocks and cost shocks, respectively). 
However, as correlations treat deviations from the mean in a symmetric way, these numbers 
indicate that reducing profit margins and output tend to go hand in hand in not being used. 
Put differently, both answers categories are often chosen to be “of little relevance” or 
“not relevant”, respectively. 
Table 3. Correlations across the relevance of different adjustment strategies 
 
Notes: Responses weighted by employment and rescaled excluding non-responses. All correlations are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The sample size is kept fixed so that it contains only non-missings for survey questions 23 (on 
cost-shocks) and 25 (on wage shocks). 
  Cost shock Wage shock 
 Adjustment 
strategy Price Margin Output Costs Price Margin Output Costs 
Cost 
shock 
Price 1.0        
Margin 0.19 1.0       
Output 0.23 0.34 1.0      
Costs 0.14 0.28 0.30 1.0     
          
Wage 
shock 
Price 0.57 0.14 0.21 0.13 1.0    
Margin 0.16 0.63 0.27 0.17 0.20 1.0   
Output 0.21 0.25 0.58 0.24 0.27 0.32 1.0  
Costs 0.13 0.25 0.27 0.60 0.16 0.26 0.14 1.0 
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Adjustment strategy after a cost shock after a wage shock 
Price/Margin/Costs 18.33% 14.80% 
Price/Margin/Output/Costs 15.11% 12.33% 
Price/Costs  14.49% 11.80% 
Margin/Costs 9.64% 9.21% 
Increase price 9.32% 9.58% 
Reduce costs 7.32% 9.32% 
None 7.04% 9.13% 
Price/Margin 6.84% 6.46% 
Reduce margin 3.60% 5.45% 
Price/Output/Costs 2.46% 2.30% 
Margin/Output/Costs 2.35% 1.49% 
Output/Costs 1.24% 0.88% 
Price/Margin/Output 1.05% 2.25% 
Reduce Output 0.52% 1.40% 
Price/Output 0.46% 2.32% 
Margin/Output 0.21% 1.27% 
 
This prompts us to group firm responses according to “packages” of adjustment 
responses. Table 4 gives the percentage of respondents that indicate that the respective 
combination of measures is “very relevant” and “relevant” for them. As Table 4 also includes 
respondents that prefer none of the adjustment strategies suggested by the questionnaire 
(see row seven) — this might be because they do not react at all or because they use other 
channels of adjustment — the columns add up to 100 percent of all respondents. The first 
three rows in Table 4 show that approximately 50 percent of the respondents increase prices 
and reduce other costs at the same time. Some of them additionally adjust the profit margin 
and reduce output. Thus, the combination of increasing prices and reducing costs seems one 
of the most popular among the respondents. This combination is slightly less favoured after 
wage shocks (only around 40 percent). 
Summing up, WDN survey data suggest that about two thirds of the firms 
increase prices after an input-cost shock, while one third tries to deal with higher costs in a 
different way and will keep prices constant. Furthermore, price increases are more likely to be 
part of a whole package of measures instead of the only response to cost-push shocks. 
The most popular combination seems to be increasing prices and reducing costs. This gives 
evidence that cost-push shocks are not passed through 1:1 in the production chain but 
smoothed by firms. Finally, these results seem to challenge the assumption that firms always 
operate at minimal costs. 60 to 70 percent of the firms (depending on the kind of shock) 
indicate that they try to reduce other costs after a cost-push shock. However, it might 
well be that the occurrence of a shock itself opens up some room for manoeuvre. It is 
possible that a shock, like an oil price shock, can be used to negotiate with suppliers on new 
conditions — probably only temporary in nature. This way of dealing with cost-push shocks 
would then constitute — at least to some extent — a shock-absorbing mechanism in the 
economy, as prices have to be raised and output reduced by less than without these cost 
reductions. 
Table 4. Share of firms choosing different adjustment strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Responses weighted by employment and rescaled excluding non-responses. The sample size is kept 
fixed so that it contains only non-missings for survey questions 23 (on cost-shocks) and 25 (on wage shocks). 
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3.2 Firms adjustment strategies and some relevant covariates 
In what follows, we focus on the two most popular adjustment strategies, namely reducing 
costs and increasing prices (see Table 2). In theory, the choice of adjustment strategy is 
dictated by firms’ marginal revenue and cost considerations. Though these are not observed, 
some of the variables available in the WDN survey dataset can be used to capture certain 
characteristics of firms’ marginal revenue and cost schedules indirectly. 
In particular, we analyse whether cost reduction is a more relevant adjustment 
strategy than price adjustment for firms that behave as price takers rather than price makers. 
The variable competition is a dummy variable coded as unity if the firm replies that it would be 
“very likely” to decrease the price of its product if the firm’s main competitor reduced its price 
(and as zero if “likely”, “not likely”, “not at all”, and “do not know/does not apply” was 
indicated by the firm).5 The share of foreign sales in a firm’s revenues can also proxy for 
the intensity of price competition, since (controlling for sector and size) market power 
should be smaller for firms that are more exposed to large international markets. 
To account for differences in production technologies and labour intensities across 
firms, our specifications also include: labour share – the share of labour costs in total costs; 
the sector in which the firm operates — seven NACE-based sector dummies (manufacturing, 
energy, construction, trade, market services, financial intermediation and non-market 
services); and firm size — a set of four dummy variables indicating firm size category in terms 
of employment (5-19, 20-49, 50-199 and 200 and more employees). 
While the choice of price adjustment as a shock-reaction strategy is shaped 
importantly by product market characteristics, the relevance of cost adjustment depends in 
theory on how easy it would be to do so. This depends on rigidities and adjustment costs 
in the labour market. In this respect, the WDN survey dataset offers a number of variables 
that can be regarded as indirect measures of rigidities and adjustment costs associated 
with the labour input. To account for wage rigidities, our set of explanatory variables includes 
collective agreement, higher level — a dummy variable showing whether a given firm adopts 
a collective agreement concluded at national, regional, sectoral or occupational level, and 
collective agreement, firm level — a dummy variable indicating the presence of collective 
bargaining at the level of the firm. 
Finally, our estimations include a set of country-specific dummies to account for 
unobserved national effects, such as those that might arise from country-specific employment 
protection legislation. Table C1 reports some basic summary statistics for the covariates 
used in the analysis and is provided in Appendix C. As can be seen from Table C1, not all 
information was provided by all responding firms. While in total 15,235 firms replied to our 
questionnaire, e.g. only 13,615 firms provided information on their share of labour costs in 
total costs. Thus, the available number of observations that can be used in the following 
regression analysis drops accordingly. As already mentioned in Section 2, our estimations 
include information from 14 countries. However, information on Ireland is only included 
for cost shocks, as the Irish questionnaire does not contain a question on wage shocks. 
3.3 Explaining the response to shocks 
We explore the determinants of firms’ choice to increase prices and/or lower costs in 
response to cost-push shocks by focusing on one of these adjustment strategies at a time. 
                                                                          
5. A slightly different question was asked in the Dutch survey, and is recoded to recover analogous information. 
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As already described in Section 3.1, firms could indicate the importance of each strategy in 
their packages of measures by telling us whether a given margin of adjustment is “very 
relevant”, “relevant”, “of little relevance” or “not relevant”. On the basis of this information, 
we define the endogenous variables as dummies, which are equal to unity if the adjustment 
strategy in question is “very relevant” or “relevant”, and zero otherwise. Thus, we model the 
determinants of price increase and cost-cutting decisions by estimating probit models of 
the following form. 
 xY   )1(Prob , 
where  is a vector of coefficients, x is a vector of explanatory variables, and  (.) denotes the 
cumulative normal distribution function. 
As shown in Figure 1, the sample is very heterogeneous across countries. Thus, 
we use regressions with country dummies. It may be of particular interest, however, 
to additionally assess whether slope coefficients differ across two groups of countries that 
may be heterogeneous across sensible and policy-relevant dimensions: the older members 
of the EU, which in our sample have all adopted the single currency, and the new Central and 
Eastern European members that have not yet entered the euro area. Thus, we report the 
coefficient of interactions with a non-euro area (Non-EA) dummy, that equals unity for firms 
that are located in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. We are 
mainly interested in the interaction with two variables: the share of labour costs in total costs, 
representing an important feature of firms’ production functions, and the share of foreign 
sales, an important feature of firms’ market conditions. The latter variable’s association with 
firms’ reaction strategies may reasonably differ between euro area and non euro-area 
countries. Firms in non-euro area countries are exposed to potentially floating exchange 
rates and, in light of the countries’ recent accession to the EU and less advanced economic 
development, may specialise in production stages where international markets are more 
competitive. 
The estimation results characterising firms’ adjustment to cost and wage shocks are 
presented in Table 5. This table shows average probit marginal effects for price increase and 
cost reduction decisions. It gives the average over the marginal effects computed for all firms 
in the sample. The size of the average marginal effect and its significance, however, do not 
differ substantially from those computed for a (hypothetical) firm for which all model covariates 
are set at their average values. These average marginal effects give an indication by how 
much the probability that a price increase or a cost reduction is a “very relevant” or “relevant” 
strategy changes, if one of the covariates changes by one unit (or change from zero to one if 
the covariate is a dummy variable). The bottom row of the table reports the predicted 
probability for a hypothetical benchmark firm to report that the response to a shock is 
“relevant” or “very relevant”. To economise on space, some of the less relevant estimates 
are not reported in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Adjustment of prices and (other) costs in response to cost shocks and 
wage shocks, probit, average marginal effects 
Cost shock Wage shock
Increase 
price
Reduce costs Increase 
price
Reduce costs
Competition (dummy) -0.0182 0.0375*** -0.0296** 0.0292**
(0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0118)
Share of foreign sales -0.0048 0.0550*** -0.0609*** 0.0458**
(0.0181) (0.0186) (0.0194) (0.0193)
Labour share -0.103*** -0.0747*** 0.117*** -0.0492*
(0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0294) (0.0290)
Collective agreement, higher level 0.0247* 0.0136 0.0390** 0.0066
(dummy) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0151)
Collective agreement, firm level -0.0046 0.0128 -0.0217* 0.0210
(dummy) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0130)
Share of foreign sales  X  Non-EA -0.0632** -0.0458 -0.0655** -0.0453
(0.0315) (0.0311) (0.0329) (0.0308)
Labour share X  Non-EA 0.0229 0.0633 0.0412 0.1140**
(0.0507) (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.050)
Observations 11123 11004 10336 10010
Pseudo-R2 0.088 0.080 0.097 0.149
Log-likelihood -6572.1 -6482.3 -6309.4 -5808.3
Observed frequency 0.650 0.661 0.592 0.574
Predicted frequency 0.660 0.676 0.598 0.578
 
 
3.3.1 COMPETITION 
Our empirical results show that stronger competition is associated with more intensive 
adjustment in (other) costs in the aftermath of supply shocks. A firm in a very competitive 
environment is 3.8 p.p. more likely to reduce costs after a cost shock and 2.9 p.p. after a 
wage shock. Reciprocally, price increases are less likely when competition in the product 
market is strong, though this effect is statistically significant only for the wage shock. 
Qualitatively, however, competition has the same effect on firms’ adjustment to both shocks: 
it makes firms more likely to reduce costs, but less likely to increase prices, as suggested 
by our theoretical considerations in Section 2.2. 
3.3.2 FOREIGN SALES 
Our complementary indicator of competitive pressure, the share of foreign sales in total sales, 
appears to matter for the way firms react to cost-push shocks as well. Specifically, we find 
that firms with a higher exposure to foreign product markets are more likely to respond to 
cost shocks by lowering other costs. In this regard, exposure to foreign markets implies a 
qualitatively similar effect to that of our more direct measure of price competition. We also find 
that a higher share of foreign sales in total sales reduces the degree to which a wage shock is 
passed-through to output prices. Foreign competitors are unlikely to be hit by the same wage 
shock, which makes it difficult for a firm with a large share of foreign sales to increase prices 
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after a wage shock. This mitigation effect on the pass-through to prices is generally stronger 
in the case of non-euro area countries (new EU member states). 
  
3.3.3 COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
Firms covered by collective bargaining at the national, regional or sectoral level are more 
likely to respond to shocks by increasing prices, whereas collective agreements at the 
firm level do not seem to have strong independent effects on price and cost adjustment. 
Thus, rigidities in marginal cost stemming from the presence of higher level collective 
agreements increase the likelihood that cost shocks and wage shocks will be passed-through 
to product prices by 2.5 p.p. and 3.9 p.p., respectively. Overall, the presence of collective 
agreements makes it more likely that adjustments are taking place by raising prices. 
3.3.4 LABOUR INTENSITY 
A firm’s production technology also affects the way it reacts to shocks. According to Table 5, 
a higher labour cost share lowers the likelihood of price adjustment after a cost shock 
(a 10 p.p. rise in the labour share lowers the incidence of price adjustment by about 1 p.p.). 
The marginal costs of firms using labour input more intensively are bound to be less sensitive 
to changes in the cost of intermediate inputs, reducing the need to adjust product prices in 
response to the input-cost shock. Since a higher labour share implies that marginal costs 
are more sensitive to labour costs, prices are more likely to be raised in response to a 
general wage increase. This is also consistent with the results obtained focusing on price 
determinants within the Inflation Persistence Network [see Fabiani et al. (2006)]. 
3.3.5 COUNTRY, SECTOR AND SIZE EFFECTS 
Summarising the results from above, we find only small differences between EU countries in 
the euro area and those that, in our sample, are both outside of the euro area and recent new 
members. The most relevant difference seems to be that the new EU-countries are less likely 
to increase prices after a supply shock when they have a high exposure to foreign markets. 
As mentioned, this may be explained by the overall more competitive character of these firms’ 
market environment. 
Country dummies are not reported in Table 5, however, we estimate sizeable and 
significant country effects. For instance, the contribution of the Estonian dummy to the 
probability of price adjustment in the case of a wage shock is estimated to be +17.8 p.p. 
(reference country for these dummies is Austria; the dummy effect is evaluated at mean 
values of other determinants). Moreover, a -41.7 p.p. effect is associated with the Hungarian 
dummy for a price adjustment in response to the wage shock. In both cases, the country 
effect is huge. Thus, we conclude that in spite of taking into account a rather extensive set of 
firm-specific characteristics, an important part of variation in firms’ adjustment to shocks 
remains attributed to national factors. Looking at linear regression analysis instead of probit 
estimates, sheds even more light on the relative explanatory power of our covariates. 
Using the partitioning of the sum of squares from a linear regression shows that the bulk 
share of the explanatory power (85-95 percent) comes from country dummies. 
To look into the possibility that these country-specific effects may be related to the 
extent of labour protection legislation (EPL), we calculated correlation coefficients between 
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the probit coefficients associated with the country dummies in the estimations of Table 5 
and the OECD EPL index.6 As shown in Table 6 in the case of a cost shock, this correlation is 
positive and quite strong (0.46) for price increases, but nearly zero for cost reductions. For the 
wage shock scenario the correlations are not significantly different from zero. Though only 
suggestive, this evidence implies that EPL is likely to be positively related to price adjustment 
in response to cost shocks. Put differently, price increases seem to be more likely in countries 
with higher employment protection. 
 
Table 6. Correlation between the probit coefficients 
of country dummies and EPL, all countries 
 
 Cost shock Wage shock 
Increase price 0.461* 0.269 
 (0.259) (0.363) 
Reduce costs 0.056 -0.208 
 (0.255) (0.274) 
 
 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * denote significance at the 10% 
significance level according to asymptotic and bootstrap standard errors. The country 
effects (coefficients associated with the country dummies) are obtained from the 
estimations described in Table 5. 
 
Our estimations suggest two additional results (also not reported in Table 5). 
First, there is a clear sectoral effect indicating that compared to the manufacturing sector, 
firms operating in the market services sector are less likely to respond to the input-cost 
shock. The same applies to the wage shock. However, with a notable exception: the degree 
to which services firms raise prices in the aftermath of a permanent increase in wages is 
equivalent to that of manufacturing firms. Second, we find that larger firms are more likely 
to emphasise the importance of the “cutting other costs” adjustment strategy. 
3.4 A counterfactual exercise 
Previous results may be used to assess how the aggregate response of prices and costs to 
cost-push shocks may be influenced by convergence within the euro area and other 
integrating economies. For this purpose, we compare aggregate results from our regression 
analysis with their hypothetical counterparts in the aftermath of a structural change. Needless 
to say, in the absence of a complete structural interpretation of our regression results, these 
counterfactuals have to be interpreted with caution. 
We assess how our results bear on the extent of wage/cost pass-through into 
prices, as an important component of the inflation transmission mechanism. Our data and 
estimates offer interesting information as to the relevance and heterogeneity of relevant 
factors in different settings. The survey weights available in the data make it possible 
to compute aggregate statistics and regression estimates may be used to infer how the 
aggregates would change if covariates changed. 
                                                                          
6. The EPL index is originally available only for OECD members. In the case of new member states, equivalent (for the 
members of OECD - updated) indicators of EPL are taken from Tonin (2005). 
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We carry out a counterfactual exercise using regression results reported in Table 5 
about the determinants of price versus cost adjustment after a shock. In particular, we show 
how the predicted probability to use some specific way of adjustment changes once we set 
the variable competition at the highest observed level, which is nearly 50 percent in the case 
of the Belgian financial intermediaries sector. 
Table 7. Change in the probability to adjust prices or costs after a cost shock 
if competition is set to the highest observed level 
(the effect after a wage shock is given in parenthesis) 
 
  Competition Price increase Cost reduction 
 
Actual  Hypo-thetical 
Predicted 
probability with 
max. competition 
Change  
in p.p. 
Predicted 
probability with 
max. competition 
Change  
in p.p. 
AT 0.14 0.50 0.66     (0.68) -0.7     (-1.0) 0.72     (0.70) 1.4     (1.1) 
BE 0.10 0.50 0.69     (0.71) -0.8     (-1.2) 0.65     (0.69) 1.8     (1.3) 
CZ 0.23 0.50 0.66     (0.54) -0.5     (-0.8) 0.81     (0.82) 0.9     (0.6) 
EE 0.14 0.50 0.87     (0.82) -0.4     (-0.8) 0.92     (0.91) 0.7     (0.5) 
ES 0.13 0.50 0.69     (0.55) -0.6     (-1.1) 0.49     (0.48) 1.6     (1.2) 
FR 0.12 0.50 0.63     (0.58) -0.8     (-1.3) 0.76     (0.15) 1.4     (0.8) 
HU 0.14 0.50 0.31     (0.23) -0.6     (-0.9) 0.62     (0.55) 1.5     (1.2) 
IE 0.13 0.50 0.44     (-----) -0.7     (-----) 0.59     (-----) 1.5     (-----) 
IT 0.17 0.50 0.65     (0.63) -0.6     (-1.0) 0.87     (0.81) 0.8     (0.8) 
LT 0.17 0.50 0.80     (0.68) -0.5     (-0.9) 0.74     (0.74) 1.2     (0.9) 
NL 0.25 0.50 0.68     (0.57) -0.5     (-0.8) 0.56     (0.57) 1.1     (0.9) 
PL 0.15 0.50 0.85     (0.81) -0.4     (-0.8) 0.85     (0.80) 1.0     (0.9) 
PT 0.23 0.50 0.73     (0.71) -0.4     (-0.7) 0.74     (0.73) 0.9     (0.7) 
SI 0.25 0.50 0.68     (0.53) -0.4     (-0.8) 0.76     (0.76) 0.8     (0.7) 
Total 0.16 0.50 0.68     (0.63) -0.6     (-1.0) 0.74     (0.65) 1.1     (0.9) 
  
Notes: Ireland’s questionnaire does not contain a question on wage shocks. Column “Competition, actual” shows 
the share of firms reporting strong competition in the survey data (the mean of the competition dummy for the 
estimation sample of column 2 in Table 5). “Competition, hypothetical” indicates the assumed counterfactual 
level of competition, which corresponds to the actual share of firms reporting strong competition in the Belgian 
financial sector. 
 
Considering an increase in competition throughout all countries to the highest 
level, Table 7 shows the change in the probability of adjusting prices and costs after an 
intermediary input-cost shock. Column 4 in Table 7 indicates that an increase in competition 
will lead to a 0.6 p.p. smaller probability that a cost-push shock is passed-through 
to prices, while the probability of cost reductions will increase by 1.1 p.p. Put differently, more 
competition will reduce the probability that cost shocks are passed through to prices. 
Moreover, the change in the pass-through of a cost shock to prices is predicted to be 
stronger in countries (euro area countries) where our measure of competition is low on 
average. Finally, Table 7 also gives the results after a wage shock in parenthesis. The results 
for a wage shock show the same direction and are of comparable size as the results for a 
cost shock. Overall, however, the effects of this counterfactual exercise are rather small. 
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4 Cost-cutting strategies 
The rich information provided by the WDN survey also allows for a deeper analysis 
with regard to the most popular adjustment strategy after cost-push shocks (see Table 2), 
namely reducing other costs. Thus, we proceed to analyse the different cost-cutting 
strategies reported by firms. The respondents were asked to report their most important 
strategy of cutting costs. They could choose among six different options: (a) reduce 
base wages, (b) reduce flexible wage components, (c) reduce the number of permanent 
employees, (d) reduce the number of temporary employees, (e) reduce hours worked 
per employee and (f) reduce non-labour costs. Our aim is to measure the extent to which 
wage rigidity implies larger employment responses to shocks when labour demand is more 
elastic and employment protection is less stringent. 
4.1 Descriptive evidence 
The answers are summarised in Table 8, which shows that about half of the firms prefer 
to reduce labour costs, while the other half prefers to reduce non-labour costs. These 
non-labour costs include for instance negotiating with suppliers about prices, reducing 
administrative costs and reducing advertising costs. The first three categories in Table 8 
imply an employment response to a shock. In reaction to a shock, and without conditioning 
on any other variable, some 35-40 percent of the responding firms plan to implement their 
cost reductions by reducing employment. Only around 10 percent of the firms indicate 
that they are likely to reduce costs by cutting flexible wage components, and only about 
2 percent would cut base wages. Finding that firms are more likely to cut employment than 
wages is of course common in the literature [e.g. Bewley (1999)]. We will analyse below how 
these differences are related to features of the firms’ environment. 
 
Table 8. Acceptance of different ways of cost adjustment (share of firms) 
 
Cost-cutting strategy after a cost shock after a wage shock 
Reduce number of 
temporary/other employees 17.56% 19.45% 
Reduce number of 
permanent employees 10.89% 11.39% 
Reduce hours worked per 
employee 7.08% 7.79% 
Reduce flexible wage 
components 9.39% 11.58% 
Reduce base wages 1.64% --- 
Reduce non-labour costs 53.44% 49.79% 
  
Notes: Responses weighted by employment and rescaled excluding non-responses; figures 
are based on survey questions 24 and 26. 
 
On the basis of the simple theoretical considerations outlined above, wage and 
employment responses are expected to be larger when firms are subject to strong product 
market competition. Moreover, they should be smaller when collective agreements reduce 
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wage flexibility, and employment protection legislation (or non-availability of temporary 
contracts, or technological features) reduces employment flexibility. The following empirical 
analysis brings this reasoning to bear on the data, combining information from the firm-level 
and the country-level. 
4.2 Adjustment channels and some relevant covariates 
To determine factors explaining the choice of the most important cost-cutting strategy, we 
run a set of probit regressions relating each adjustment choice to theoretically relevant 
covariates. In particular, we focus on indicators of product market structure and labour 
market institutions. The dependent variable in the probit regression equals one if the firm 
indicates that the respective cost-cutting strategy is the most important one, and zero 
otherwise. Additional to the covariates already described in Section 3 (competition, share of 
foreign sales, labour share, collective agreement (higher level and firm-level) as well as 
country, industry and size), we include more variables on characteristics of the labour market, 
as we are especially interested in their influence on labour-cost cutting strategies. 
 
Table 9. Cost adjustment strategies and some relevant covariates, 
probit, average marginal effects 
 
 Cost shock Wage shock 
 Permanent employment 
Temporary 
employment Wages 
Permanent 
employment 
Temporary 
employment Wages 
       
Competition  0.0209** 0.0158 0.0231** 0.0275*** 0.0268** 0.0221** 
(dummy) (0.0089) (0.0114) (0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0125) (0.0103) 
       
Share of  -0.0182 0.0146 -0.0163 -0.0123 0.0345* -0.0164 
foreign sales (0.0135) (0.0166) (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0179) (0.0161) 
       
Labour share 0.0279 -0.0179 0.0891*** 0.0419* 0.0308 0.0790*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0253) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0271) (0.0232) 
       
Coll. agreement  0.0116 0.0398*** -0.0186* -0.0036 0.0352** -0.0268** 
higher level (0.0110) (0.0148) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0159) (0.0122) 
(dummy)       
Coll. agreement  0.0055 -0.0055 -0.0004 0.0120 0.0109 -0.0167* 
firm level  (0.0076) (0.0103) (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0116) (0.0090) 
(dummy)       
Share of temp.  -0.0725*** 0.135*** -0.0299 -0.0503** 0.137*** -0.0417** 
employment (0.0212) (0.0234) (0.0194) (0.0220) (0.0245) (0.0207) 
       
Share of part-  0.0129 -0.0133 -0.0448** 0.0066 -0.0107 -0.0371 
time empl. (0.0190) (0.0280) (0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0308) (0.0238) 
       
Share of  -0.0002 -0.0004* 0.0010*** -0.00058** -0.0004 0.0012*** 
variable wages (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00023) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
       
Share of  0.0272 0.0125 0.0155 0.0183 0.0107 0.0099 
foreign sales (0.0208) (0.0304) (0.0224) (0.0234) (0.0330) (0.0242) 
X Non-EA       
Labour share 0.0894*** -0.0079 -0.0387 0.0790* -0.0789 -0.0113 
X Non-EA (0.0440) (0.0495) (0.0415) (0.0469) (0.0529) (0.0441) 
       
Observations 8037 8037 8037 7415 7415 7415 
Log-Likelihood -2042.6 -3461.0 -2520.7 -2194.3 -3360.7 -2441.0 
Pseudo-R2 0.0473 0.0649 0.0657 0.0363 0.0742 0.0601 
Observed 
frequency  0.0791 0.1731 0.1106 0.0957 0.1926 0.1159 
Predicted 
frequency 0.0684 0.1552 0.0938 0.0866 0.1704 0.1019 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. Not reported: country, sector and firms’ size effects. EA abbreviates euro area. 
The marginal effects of interaction terms are averages across all observations of the Ai and Norton (2003) 
expressions. 
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Hence, we introduce the share of temporary employment, as a continuous variable 
giving the percentage share of employees with a temporary contract. The share of part-time 
employment gives the percentage share of employees with a permanent contract, but 
working part-time. Finally, the share of variable wages is also a continuous variable and 
gives the percentage share of the total wage bill that is related to individual or company 
performance related bonuses and benefits. Moreover, theoretically employment protection 
legislation (EPL) should be associated with the decision of either adjusting employment 
or wages after a cost-push shock. However, our regressions include country dummies 
in order to control for national differences in general. Thus, we cannot include EPL indicators, 
without variation within countries. Following the regression analysis, however, we will 
investigate the association between country dummies and the EPL indexes. 
Table 9 presents results on cost reductions due to employment (permanent and 
temporary) and wage adjustments; results on hours and non-labour-cost adjustment 
are reported only in Appendix C (see Table C2). We analyse the impact of product market 
competition (competition and share of foreign sales), the firm’s technology (labour share), 
the structure of the workforce and its remuneration (share of temporary and part-time 
employment as well as share of variable wages) and labour market institutions (collective 
agreement, firm level; collective agreement, higher level) on each type of cost-adjustment 
strategy separately. Moreover, as previously mentioned, we consider country dummies as 
well as industry and size dummies in order to control for all kinds of national differences and 
differences in technology. 
Consider, to begin with, the results for the impact of competition on the choice of 
the preferred cost-adjustment channel. Product market competition appears to be positively 
associated with the relevance of employment and wage adjustment after both types of 
shocks. For a given degree of wage rigidity, this is consistent with standard labour demand 
theory, in that, for a given labour share, a more elastic product demand function implies 
a more elastic labour demand and a more pressing need for firms to reduce employment. 
This result is similar for permanent and temporary employment. Also wage adjustment is 
more likely in a highly competitive environment. As shown in Table C2, the main impact 
of competition is on the choice between labour and non-labour costs. These costs could 
include, for instance, advertising, marketing and other costs that in a competitive environment 
should be minimised even without a negative shock.7 Firms operating in a highly competitive 
environment are thus less likely to reduce non-labour costs and more likely to reduce labour 
costs, regardless which type of labour costs. 
Regarding wage-setting institutions, we find that collective agreements outside the 
firm, that is collective agreements signed at the national, regional, sectoral or occupational 
level, make an adjustment of temporary employment more likely. Imposing a wage agreement 
negotiated at a higher than the firm level to a firm increases the probability of laying-off 
temporary workers by approximately 4 p.p. Furthermore, there is a tendency for wages 
to be more sticky when there are collective wage agreements present. Thus, firms covered 
by collective wage agreements appear to reduce the number of temporary employees 
(and not the number of permanent employees) due to wage rigidity. It should be noted 
                                                                          
7. A multinomial model was estimated for a robustness check. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones described 
above. Competition variables, which are perceived competition and the share of foreign sales, tend to affect more 
the decision between non-labour cost and labour cost adjustment, rather than the decision between the different types 
of labour costs. 
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that country dummies are included in our regressions, already capturing national-specific 
characteristics of collective bargaining institutions. 
The share of temporary workers features a relatively strong association with the 
character of cost-cutting strategies. Firms with a high share of temporary employment 
are more likely to indicate layoffs of temporary employees as the preferred adjustment 
strategy, and less likely to reduce the number of permanent employees and wages (as well as 
to try and decrease non-labour costs). An increase in the share of temporary workers by 
10 percentage points increases the probability of cutting temporary employment by 1.4 p.p. 
Thus, temporary employment acts as a buffer against employment fluctuations for permanent 
workers and against wage fluctuations. 
 
Figure 2. Adjustment of permanent employment: Correlation between EPL 
(for permanent employment, vertical axis) and country dummies 
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Figure 3. Adjustment of temporary employment: Correlation between EPL 
(for permanent employment, vertical axis) and country dummies 
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Moreover, EPL might have an effect on the firm’s decision on which type of costs to 
adjust after a shock. As already mentioned, our regression analysis captures the differences 
in EPL across countries by country dummies. Although, they capture also other national 
specificities, we investigate whether EPL is playing a role in explaining country-level 
differences in the strategies to adjust costs. Figure 2, for instance, shows that in the 
permanent employment adjustment regression, country dummies are negatively correlated 
with the degree of EPL strictness for regular workers (-0.34). EPL explains almost 12 percent 
of the country dummies variance. This suggests that firms in countries with a high degree of 
employment protection are less likely to reduce permanent employment after a shock. Thus, 
EPL works as intended — it protects permanent employees. In the case of temporary 
employment it is, however, the other way around. The relationship between EPL and the 
country dummies is positive. Here, EPL explains only about 4 percent of country variance. 
In the temporary employment adjustment regression the correlation between the EPL index 
and country dummies is approximately 0.2, suggesting that firms in countries with a high EPL 
index tend to be more likely to reduce costs via laying-off temporary workers. 
Now we turn to some more variables included in our regressions. The results 
presented in Table 9 suggest that firms using a labour intensive technology are more likely to 
cut wages. Furthermore, as shown in Table C2 in the Appendix, a high labour share is also 
associated with a higher likelihood of non-labour costs reduction. Moreover, a larger share of 
variable wages is also associated with easier wage adjustment in reaction to shocks. Babecký 
et al. (2009b), who focus on alternative margins of adjustment in labour costs than base 
wages, find that these alternative margins, like bonus payments, are more commonly used by 
firms subject to (nominal) base wage rigidities. In our regressions, the base-wage rigidity 
implied by higher-level wage agreements implies that temporary employment bears the 
brunt of adjustment. However, a larger share of variable wage costs tends to stabilise both 
temporary and permanent employment, privileging wage adjustment for all types of cost-push 
shocks. 
In order to analyse the differences between euro area and non-euro area countries, 
we again estimate the average marginal effect of the interaction between a non-euro area 
dummy and two important continuous variables: the share of labour costs in total costs, 
and that of foreign sales in revenues. For firms in non-euro area countries, labour intensity 
is associated with a significantly higher incidence of permanent employment reactions 
to cost-push shocks. This may well reflect the more flexible lay-off arrangements of less 
heavily regulated markets. 
Overall, our results suggest that product market competition is an important 
determinant in the firm’s decision to adjust labour costs instead of non-labour costs. Firms 
operating in a highly competitive environment are less likely to reduce non-labour costs and 
more likely to reduce labour costs via cutting the number of employees as well as wages. 
Moreover, the decision between different kinds of labour costs (wages versus employment) is 
mainly driven by the framework of the labour market. In this respect, wage setting institutions, 
in particular, wage agreements signed outside the firm, tend to make wages more sticky and 
force adjustment via temporary employees. A high degree of employment protection (EPL) 
affects temporary employment in the same way. While EPL works as intended and protects 
jobs of permanent employees after a cost-push shock, the cost adjustment takes again place 
via the adjustment of temporary employees. 
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4.3 A counterfactual exercise 
We carry out two counterfactual exercises using regression results reported in the previous 
section about the determinants of different margins of adjustment after a shock. In particular, 
we show how the predicted probability to use some specific way of adjustment changes 
once we modify variables as competition and the share of firms affected by collective 
bargaining at higher level than the firm. 
 
Table 10. Change in the probability to adjust permanent employment and non-labour 
costs after a wage shock if competition is set to the highest observed level 
 
  Competition Permanent employment adjustment Non-labour cost adjustment 
 
Actual  Hypo-thetical 
Predicted 
probability with 
max. competition 
Change  
in p.p. 
Predicted 
probability with 
max. competition 
Change  
in p.p. 
AT 0.14 0.50 0.10 0.01 0.57 -0.02 
BE 0.10 0.50 0.11 0.01 0.49 -0.04 
CZ 0.23 0.50 0.16 0.01 0.50 -0.02 
EE 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.01 0.47 -0.03 
ES 0.13 0.50 0.09 0.01 0.38 -0.03 
FR 0.12 0.50 0.09 0.01 0.43 -0.03 
HU 0.14 0.50 0.07 0.01 0.69 -0.02 
IT 0.17 0.50 0.13 0.01 0.42 -0.02 
LT 0.17 0.50 0.11 0.01 0.61 -0.02 
NL 0.25 0.50 0.03 0.00 0.45 -0.02 
PL 0.15 0.50 0.17 0.01 0.56 -0.03 
PT 0.23 0.50 0.09 0.01 0.41 -0.02 
SI 0.25 0.50 0.08 0.00 0.61 -0.02 
Total 0.16 0.50 0.12 0.01 0.47 -0.02 
  
 
Table 10 shows the potential impact of a structural reform increasing competition in 
product markets in European countries (for instance in the context of the Lisbon strategy). 
In particular, we simulate an increase in competition to the level observed in the financial 
intermediation sector in Belgium, the maximum in our sample. As discussed in the previous 
section, competition increases the probability to adjust employment after a shock. Thus, 
an increase in competition will lead to more employment adjustment. However, the impact on 
predicted probabilities is quite small, around 1 pp. in each country, despite the simulated 
change in the competition environment is not trivial. In this respect, we should be aware 
that our simulations do no capture aggregate effects in the sense that firms are confronted 
with a higher competitive scenario but their reaction do not take into account that all other 
firms are now changing their cost-cutting strategies. In addition, more competition would 
reduce the adjustment of non-labour costs. 
Table 11 reports the simulated impact of more rigid wages at the firm level 
associated with a higher incidence of collective agreements signed outside the firm. If the 
share of collective bargaining at higher level is set to unity (as in LT, and not very different 
from 0.98-0.99 shares recorded in FR and BE), the fraction of firms adjusting temporary 
employment is slightly higher, while that of firms adjusting wages symmetrically declines. 
Both effects are, however, quite small. 
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Table 11. Change in the probability to adjust temporary employment and wages 
after a cost shock if the incidence of collective bargaining at higher level than 
the firm is set to 1 
 
  Incidence of 
collective bargaining 
at higher level than the 
firm 
Temporary employment 
adjustment Wage adjustment 
 
Actual  Hypo-thetical 
Predicted 
probability with 
higher collective 
bargaining 
Change  
in p.p. 
Predicted 
probability 
higher collective 
bargaining  
Change  
in p.p. 
AT 0.96 1 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 
BE 0.98 1 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.00 
CZ 0.17 1 0.20 0.04 0.08 -0.01 
EE 0.03 1 0.19 0.04 0.13 -0.02 
ES 0.83 1 0.26 0.01 0.12 0.00 
FR 0.99 1 0.27 0.00 0.08 0.00 
HU 0.00 1 0.09 0.02 0.08 -0.02 
IT 0.68 1 0.20 0.01 0.04 0.00 
LT 1.00 1 0.22 0.00 0.08 0.00 
NL 0.01 1 0.14 0.03 0.10 -0.02 
PL 0.45 1 0.32 0.03 0.02 0.00 
PT 0.04 1 0.12 0.03 0.13 -0.02 
SI 0.59 1 0.16 0.01 0.26 -0.01 
Total 0.74 1 0.15 0.01 0.11 -0.01 
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5 Conclusions 
Empirical evidence from the WDN survey highlights several characteristics of price, wage and 
employment reactions to changes in the economic environment for numerous European 
countries. 
Our analysis shows that firms react to shocks in wages and others costs in 
theoretically sensible ways. In a simple theoretical framework, a firm in a competitive 
environment with a high elasticity of product demand and a small margin would be more 
likely to change its price in reaction to a wage shock or a cost shock that is common to all 
firms in the industry. When prices are sticky, however, a high elasticity of product demand 
and small margins make it easier for wage and cost shocks to overcome the cost of price 
changes. In the survey data, firms that report facing strong competition in the product market 
are less likely to increase prices and more likely to reduce costs after a wage shock (stated in 
the survey question to be common to all firms in the industry). A higher export share in total 
sales has a qualitatively similar role, whereas the presence of collective wage agreements at 
industry or national level makes a price increase more likely. The data also seem to suggest 
that price increases are more likely in countries with more stringent employment protection 
legislation. 
The second part of the study focuses on cost-cutting strategies and the factors that 
explain the choice of the strategy. The data indicate that competition and other indications of 
a high labour-demand elasticity increase the likelihood of cost-cutting strategies via labour 
costs, either through wage adjustment or employment reduction. We also find that firms 
covered by collective wage agreements are more likely to look for cost reductions by reducing 
the number of temporary employees and less likely to reduce wages. Overall, it appears that 
temporary employment acts as a buffer against fluctuations in permanent employment 
and against wage fluctuations. EPL insulates permanent employment from cost-push shocks 
but makes adjustment in temporary employment more likely. 
Assessing the extent to which such features imply differences in the behaviour 
across countries and firms in our sample can help determining the extent to which the wage 
moderation apparent in recent European experiences is due to stronger product market 
competition, within and across countries’ borders, and how much reflects weaker union 
power in wage setting, with important implications for inflation transmission mechanisms. 
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Appendix A: Survey questions 
In questions 23 and 25, the relevance of each adjustment variable was assessed on a 
categorical scale: 1 - "not relevant"; 2 - "of little relevance"; 3 - "relevant"; 4 - "very relevant."  
In questions 24 and 26, respondents had to choose a single option, namely the most 
important adjustment channel. 
 
 
 
23. How relevant is each one of the following strategies when your firm faces an unanticipated increase in 
the cost of an intermediate input (e.g. an oil price increase) affecting all firms in the market? Please tick an 
option for each line. 
Increase prices.   
Reduce margins.  
Reduce output.  
Reduce other costs.  
 
24. If the reduction of other costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 23, please indicate the main 
channel through which this goal is achieved: Please choose a single option, the most important factor.  
1=Reduce base wages 
2=Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc ) 
3=Reduce the number of permanent employees  
4=Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers 
5=Adjust the number of hours worked per employee 
6=Reduce other non-labour costs 
 
25. How relevant is each one of the following strategies when your firm faces an unanticipated permanent 
increase in wages (e.g. due to the renewal of the national contract) affecting all firms in the market? Please 
tick an option for each line. 
Increase prices.  
Reduce margins.  
Reduce output.  
Reduce other costs.  
 
26. If the reduction of other costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 25, please indicate the main 
channel through which this goal is achieved: Please choose a single option, the most important factor.  
1=Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc) 
2=Reduce the number of permanent employees  
3=Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers 
4=Adjust the number of hours worked per employee 
5=Reduce non-labour costs 
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Appendix B: Theoretical impact of shocks on wages and employment 
To maximise profits in a ‘right to manage’ setting employers should choose employment so 
as to equate the wage, which they take as given, to labour’s marginal impact on firm’s 
revenues, mrp(l). Formally, consider a log-linear schedule 
wi= - i  l i+a i  
where w is the log of employer labour cost, li  is employment, a indexes marginal revenue, 
and i<1 is the elasticity of the inverse labour demand schedule. Symmetrically, let i denote 
the elasticity of wages to employment: 
wi =  i  l i  + s i  , 
where changes of the si shifter may represent a wage shock. Solving for wages and 
employment, we have 
wi  = [ i  / (i+i)]si + [i/(i+i)]ai, 
li  = (ai– si)/( i+i). 
Wage shocks can be represented by Δs in this simple framework. In equilibrium, 
Δwi  = [ i/ (i+i)] Δsi , 
Δli  = Δsi/( i+i), 
so the employment impact is larger when  is small, i.e., when labour demand is more 
sensitive to cost conditions. 
In turn, labour demand elasticity depends on the degree of decreasing returns to 
labour (as indexed by the share of labour in minimised total costs) and, more interestingly, 
on the elasticity of product demand and labour’s substitutability with other factors of 
production [by the “Marshall-Hicks” conditions, see e.g. Burda (2000)]:  is the weighted 
average of the constant-output elasticity of substitution, σ, and the elasticity of revenues 
to output. The cost share of labour is the weighting factor applied to these substitution 
and scale effects into the total elasticity of labour demand. In response to other factor price 
shocks, factor substitutability is similarly relevant. 
As to the role of supply elasticity, the employment response to shocks is small 
when  is large: wages then bear the brunt of adjustment according to 
li = Δai/( i+i). (4) 
Conversely, if wages do not change (possibly because they are set by binding 
agreements at more aggregate levels), then employment responds strongly to other cost 
shocks. 
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Appendix C: Details on empirical results 
Table C1. Covariates used in the analysis of Section 3 and 4 
 
Variable   Type Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Number of obs. 
Country:   AT Dummy 0.037  0 1 15235 
                 BE Dummy 0.094  0 1 15235 
                 CZ Dummy 0.026  0 1 15235 
                 EE Dummy 0.024  0 1 15235 
                 ES Dummy 0.120  0 1 15235 
                 FR Dummy 0.133  0 1 15235 
                 HU Dummy 0.132  0 1 15235 
                 IE Dummy 0.065  0 1 15235 
                 IT Dummy 0.063  0 1 15235 
                 LT Dummy 0.023  0 1 15235 
                 NL Dummy 0.070  0 1 15235 
                 PL Dummy 0.076  0 1 15235 
                 PT Dummy 0.094  0 1 15235 
                 SI Dummy 0.044  0 1 15235 
Sector:     Manufacturing Dummy 0.399  0 1 15171 
                Energy Dummy 0.012  0 1 15171 
                Construction Dummy 0.076  0 1 15171 
                Trade Dummy 0.204  0 1 15171 
                Market services Dummy 0.272  0 1 15171 
                Financial intermediaries Dummy 0.024  0 1 15171 
                Non-market services   Dummy 0.013  0 1 15171 
Size:        5-19 Dummy 0.260  0 1 14972 
                20-49 Dummy 0.224  0 1 14972 
                50-199   Dummy 0.304  0 1 14972 
                200+   Dummy 0.212  0 1 14972 
Competition   Dummy 0.164  0 1 14139 
Share of foreign sales Fraction 0.193 0.308 0 1 13810 
Labour share  Fraction 0.339 0.201 0.001 1 13615 
Collective agreement, higher level Dummy 0.597  0 1 15099 
Collective agreement, firm level  Dummy 0.243  0 1 15026 
EPL for permanent workers Index 2.442 0.734 1.603 4.167 13860 
Share of part-time employment Fraction  0.094 0.180 0 1 15021 
Share of temporary employment Fraction 0.094 0.184 0 1 14991 
Share of variable wages Fraction 0.120 0.191 0 1 13277 
  
Notes: EPL is an index ranging from 0 (low strictness) to 5 (high strictness). 
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Table C2. Cost adjustment strategies and some relevant covariates, 
probit, average marginal effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Not reported: country, sector 
and firms’ size effects. EA abbreviates euro area. Changes to the marginal effects 
of interaction terms are averages across all observations of the Ai and Norton 
(2003) expressions. 
 
 
 Cost shock Wage shock 
 Hours Non-labour cost Hours 
Non-labour 
cost 
     
Competition (dummy) -0.0008 -0.0593*** -0.0078 -0.0734*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0149) (0.0072) (0.0153) 
     
Share of foreign sales -0.0138 0.0321 -0.0169 -0.0022 
 (0.0103) (0.0229) (0.0112) (0.0244) 
     
Labour share 0.0174 -0.116*** 0.0018 -0.142*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0349) (0.0169) (0.0372) 
     
Collective agreement  -0.0004 -0.0217 -0.0142 -0.0012 
higher level (dummy) (0.0095) (0.0188) (0.0109) (0.0205) 
     
Collective agreement -0.0031 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0078 
firm level (dummy) (0.0064) (0.0142) (0.0072) (0.0151) 
     
Share of temporary 0.0183 -0.0598* 0.0382** -0.0884*** 
employment (0.0147) (0.0332) (0.0155) (0.0338) 
     
Share of part-time 0.0573*** 0.0014 0.0620*** 0.00876 
employment (0.0149) (0.0355) (0.0170) (0.0379) 
     
Share of variable wages -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
     
Share of foreign sales X 0.0161 -0.0395 0.0049 -0.0001 
non-euro area (0.0215) (0.0378) (0.0213) (0.0397) 
     
Labour share X -0.0175 -0.0904 -0.0016 -0.0752 
non-euro area (0.030) (0.0621) (0.0315) (0.0631) 
     
Observations 8037 8037 7415 7415 
Log-Likelihood -1689.0 -5276.1 -1651.8 -4942.0 
Pseudo-R2 0.0522 0.0326 0.0524 0.0371 
Observed frequency  0.0626 0.5762 0.0672 0.5154 
Predicted frequency 0.0519 0.5763 0.0564 0.5149 
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